February 2008 -- (Presentation) Overview of Talk: Market definition in traditional markets, Conceptually, same principles apply in online retail
markets, But…the nature of online competition impacts. Estimates of demand elasticities, Different consumers differently, Relevant costs, Number of relevant competitors. Market Definition: The Guidelines: “Group of products” and “geographic area.” “No bigger than necessary” to satisfy
hypothetical monopolist test. “Employed solely as a methodological tool.” Example: Symmetric Cournot oligopoly. Candidate market with n sellers offering perfect substitutes. Constant marginal cost, c. Constant market elasticity of demand, E. Individual firm’s elasticity: EF = nE
September 2008 -- (Article) Although the basic principles used to define a relevant market or to analyze
unilateral competitive effects in traditional retail settings also apply in online
retail markets, several features of the online environment add complexities to
the analysis. This paper examines some of the results in the economics and
marketing literatures that can influence market definition and competitive
effects analysis in online retail settings. I argue that a failure to account properly
for certain aspects of online markets can lead to erroneous definitions of
the relevant market and, more importantly, erroneous conclusions regarding
the unilateral competitive effects of horizontal mergers.
Citation
"Market Definition in Online Markets" by Michael Baye, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 4(3), 639–653 (Sept. 2008), Quick Links: Merger Analysis in High Tech Markets Conference
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