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Autonomy and Independence: The Normative Face of Transaction Costs

Robert P. Merges, UC Berkeley School of Law, Home Page

Publication Date: Spring 2010

Quick Links: Gridlock Economy Conference, Gridlock Speaker Biographies


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October 2009 -- Anticommons theory made a splash, and is today being expanded and applied, because it shifted our collective attention in a crucial way. Before the 1990s, the big policy questions in IP were all about individual IP rights: when should a copyright or patent be granted, when denied? Anticommons theory burst into this conventional conversation like an unruly drunk at a ballet recital. It demanded attention. It said, in effect, “you may mean well, but you’re missing the big point. You’re wasting your time!” The big point is not the individual grant of an IP right. It’s the aggregate impact of granting many rights to many discrete and independent right-holders. It’s the cumulative effect of all the transactions necessary to pull these disparate rights together into a useable bundle. That’s where the action is now, and it was anticommons theory that said so most clearly and most convincingly.

The theory’s big splash has produced a pushback, in the form of empirical studies looking for evidence of the anticommons dynamic.1 Though it is early days for this sort of study, the quick move to test the theory speaks volumes about its impact. These studies raise some interesting points, which I address later in this Essay. My main thrust however is elsewhere. What really intrigues me about anticommons theory is what it means to the normative foundations of IP law. How does the shift I identified – from the grant of a single right, to the system-wide impact of many rights – affect our understanding of whether IP law is a good or bad thing for society? How does a renewed interest in transaction costs affect our beliefs about fundamental policy issues in the field? And finally, how does anticommons theory translate into specific, granular policies, such as what to do about the fair use doctrine in copyright, or how far patent law should encourage patents on genes and proteins? These are the sorts of topics I take up here.


Citation

"Autonomy and Independence: The Normative Face of Transaction Costs" by Robert Merges, October 2, 2009, Quick Links: Gridlock Economy Conference


Related Scholarship

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"Heller's Gridlock Economy In Perspective" by Richard Epstein, October 2, 2009, Quick Links: Gridlock Economy Conference

"The Wasteland: Anticommons, White Spaces, and the Fallacy of Spectrum" by Kevin Werbach, October 2, 2009, Quick Links: Gridlock Economy Conference

"Google Book Search in the Gridlock Economy" by Doug Lichtman, October 2, 2009, Quick Links: Gridlock Economy Conference

"Autonomy and Independence: The Normative Face of Transaction Costs" by Robert Merges, October 2, 2009, Quick Links: Gridlock Economy Conference

"On Being Misled by Transaction Cost Economics: Externalities, Commons, and Gridlocks" by Harold Demsetz, October 2, 2009, Quick Links: Gridlock Economy Conference



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